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AVOIDING RESPONSIBILITY: THE CASE FOR
AMENDING THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE PRIOR ART IN
PATENT LAW
John O. Curry*
Abstract: Federal regulation requires patent applicants in the United States to disclose to
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) a wide range of references that might
be material to their invention’s patentability. Applicant disclosure of prior art currently plays
a large role in the prosecution and litigation of patents. The effects are quite deleterious,
resulting in the filing of unnecessary references that go unreviewed in the USPTO and
providing plausible grounds for the assertion of inequitable conduct defenses in patent
infringement actions. This Comment looks at the history of the laws that evolved into the
codified duty to disclose prior art and finds that the historical rationales no longer justify such
an imposition. It also examines several foreign jurisdictions that differ from the United States
in their mandates to disclose prior art, ultimately recommending the adoption of the standard
used by the European Patent Office as a way to resolve both the administrative and legal
challenges posed by the current standard.

INTRODUCTION
The year 2017 marked the fiftieth anniversary of President Lyndon
Johnson’s Commission on the Patent System, created to conduct the first
comprehensive reconceptualization of patent law in the United States
since 1836.1 The Commission’s Report (“Report”) has had significant
influence on the patent laws in the years since its introduction,2 and over
the years, many of its recommendations have found a place in American
patent law.3 But one change that followed the Report has grown to have
*
J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2020. I would like to thank
Hayley J. Talbert for allowing me to pursue my individual interest in beginning this research, and
my colleagues on Washington Law Review for their work in making this Comment worthy of
publication.
1. S. REP. NO. 71-184 (1967).
2. See Patent System and Harmonization Act of 1992: Hearing on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978 Before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. and Judicial Admin. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.
111–12 (1993) (statement of Robert B. Benson, President, Bancroft Corporation); S. REP. NO. 96617, at 11 (1980).

3. The Report recommended the implementation of a first-to-file system, provisional applications,
and published applications. See S. REP. NO. 71-184 (1967). Those features were eventually enacted
by Congress. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011)
(moving the United States to a first-to-file system); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No.
103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4986–87 (allowing for the filing of provisional patent applications); District
of Columbia Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1536 (1999) (incorporating
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an altogether deleterious effect: the codified duty to disclose prior art to
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), as set forth in
37 C.F.R. § 1.56.4 This rule requires applicants to submit any reference
they know to be material to the patentability of their application, and
carries an exceedingly harsh penalty for failure under the judicial doctrine
of inequitable conduct.5 Searching for, gathering, and submitting such a
tremendous amount of information imposes vast costs on applicants
seeking to comply with USPTO regulations, and the USPTO’s own
guidelines suggest submission of anything that could possibly be
characterized as prior art.6
Recent scholarship has largely focused on judicial standards
surrounding inequitable conduct and whether those benchmarks set by the
Federal Circuit’s landmark decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co.7 can alleviate these problems.8 This Comment proposes
that the true problem may be further upstream, and that what needs reform
is not the inequitable conduct doctrine, but rather the codified disclosure
requirements that constitute a portion of the duty of candor placed on
patent applicants.9 Approaching the problem from this direction has
several advantages. Not only will removing the statutory duty to disclose
prior art block the simplest avenue to spurious inequitable conduct claims,
it will also save applicants the expense of compiling the required
references and spare the examiner the exhaustion of sorting through
references of debatable relevance. This solution is easier to implement
than modifying the judicial standard, as Congress or the USPTO can alter
the relevant rules.
by reference S. 1948, 106th Cong. (1999), requiring patent applications to be published after
eighteen months).
4. Lawrence Pope, Inconsistency Should Not be Materiality: The Flaws in 37 C.F.R. Sec.
1.56(B)(2), 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 491, 493 (2011).
5. See DAVID HRICIK & MERCEDES MEYER, PATENT ETHICS 129–34 (2009) (discussing the
difficulty of complying with this requirement while avoiding charges of inequitable conduct).
6. Id. “When in doubt, it is desirable and safest to submit information. Even though the attorney,
agent, or applicant doesn’t consider it necessarily material, someone else may see it differently and
embarrassing questions can be avoided.” U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION PROCEDURE § 2004(10) (9th ed. 2017).
7. 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Therasense Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. raised the threshold
required to prove inequitable conduct by applicants in patent prosecution. See infra section III.C.
8. See generally Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct
Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 729 (2009) (proposing minimizing the remedy); Eric E.
Johnson, The Case for Eliminating Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Defense, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
ONLINE 1, 14 (2017) (proposing eliminating the inequitable conduct defense entirely); Christian E.
Mammen, Controlling the Plague: Reforming the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1329, 1329 (2009) (proposing codified standards for materiality and intent).
9. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2019).
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Part I of this Comment addresses the role that disclosure of prior art
plays in patent law, both in theory and in practice. Part II discusses the
origins of the inequitable conduct doctrine and the development of
unenforceability as a remedy for fraud in patent law. Part III concerns the
origin of the codified duty to disclose prior art to the USPTO, and the
responding evolution of inequitable conduct through the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit into its current form. Part IV
looks to foreign jurisdictions for alternative approaches to the duty to
disclose and finds a wide variety of practices among countries with
advanced research sectors. Part V makes the case that it would be best to
follow those countries that have done away with this duty entirely.
I.

THE ROLE OF DISCLOSURE IN PATENT LAW

A.

Statutory Requirements in Patent Law in Theory

Patent law is, at its heart, all about disclosure: the essential public
function of a patent is to disclose the invention to the world.10 The United
States, like countries across the world, grants a legal monopoly on an
invention to an inventor in exchange for disclosure of that invention to the
public.11 The United States Code’s Title 35 (the U.S. patent code) requires
that a patent be “new and useful,” and (relatedly) that it not be “obvious”
in the light of “prior art.”12 Both novelty and non-obviousness presuppose
some existing technology already patented or in the public domain: the
“prior art” that is central to determining whether a person’s invention is
entitled a patent.13
Both the examiner and the applicant have incentives to find and submit
prior art.14 For the applicant, it has been shown that any post-issuance
challenge to the patent’s novelty or non-obviousness is much less likely
to achieve success if the applicant cited the key references during
prosecution.15 Similarly, the examiner and the office can better perform
10. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 541 (2009).
11. See id.
12. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2018). Modern patent law contains many features similar to the first patent
system promulgated in Venice in 1474, such as requirements that the invention be both novel and useful.
See Guilio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166, 177 (1948).
13. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Prior Art and Possession, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 123, 127
(2018). Holbrook’s analysis of the confusion surrounding precisely what constitutes prior art should
be of note to the interested reader; so too is Charles M. Hough’s more lighthearted take, which shows
just how long this doctrine has befuddled readers. See generally Charles M. Hough, “Prior Art,” 17
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 401 (1935).
14. Jay P. Kesan & Marc Banik, Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D
Investment with Incentives to Disclose Prior Art, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23 (2000).
15. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents,
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their duties if they are fully informed as to the state of the art.16 More
information will generally result in patent claims that accurately reflect
the scope of the invention.17 This will result in patents that not only
withstand scrutiny, but are also not overly broad and leave space for
future innovation.18
Such reasoning grounds the presumption of validity, a central premise
of the United States’s patent system.19 The presumption, in the context of
patent infringement cases, requires courts to defer to the USPTO’s
determinations of patent validity unless the defendant can show error by
“clear and convincing” evidence.20 This presumption of validity
permeates the patent system, making it easy for patentees to assert their
rights, and correspondingly difficult for infringers to avoid penalties by
requiring them to prove invalidity by a clear and convincing standard.21 It
is premised on the “administrative correctness” of the USPTO—the idea
that, because actions within the USPTO are efficient and accurate, clear
and convincing evidence is necessary to overturn its judgements.22 One
component of this is the idea that the examiner should have the best
possible picture of the state of the art—something that has traditionally
been seen as the applicant’s responsibility to ensure.23
B.

Statutory Requirements in Patent Law in Practice

At present, it is the applicant’s duty to ensure that the Patent Examiner
is provided with all information “known [by the applicant] to be material

26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 234 (1998). A patent’s validity is contingent on the invention being both novel
and non-obvious in light of previous discoveries in that field. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103.
16. See Kesan & Banik, supra note 14, at 36–37.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 15, at 231 (“The rationale is that the trier of fact will be
reluctant to second-guess the Examiner about an art reference that the Examiner has already
considered, but that the trier of fact may be willing to invalidate a patent based on information that
was not available to the Examiner.”).
20. Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60
STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 (2007).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2018) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in
independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the
validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though
dependent upon an invalid claim. . . . The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim
thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”).
22. Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 1569 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
23. Panel Discussion: Recent Developments in Patent Law, in PATENT PROCUREMENT AND
EXPLOITATION 266–67 (Virginia Shook Cameron ed., 1966).
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to patentability.”24 If an applicant fails to perform this duty, they can be
considered to have failed to prosecute their application with candor and
good faith—and may lose their patent rights under the doctrine of
inequitable conduct.25 The effect is to place the burden of providing
evidence against the applicant’s patent application on the applicant. This
requirement has been criticized as encouraging flawed performance of the
duty of disclosure it seeks to enforce.26
In practice, the duty of candor imposes a far greater burden on the
applicant than simply communicating to the office information to aid in
prosecuting the patent. First, the applicant has to gather from any
individual involved in the invention, or the application, any references that
could be construed (by the courts, or by an examiner) as being “material”
to the patentability of the application.27 Then they must submit these
references to the office, taking care to walk the line between filing too
many references—burying the more material references among the less—
and filing too few.28 Worse still are the costs of failing to adequately
discharge this difficult and confusing duty, as the courts have long held
that withholding information material to patentability constitutes
inequitable conduct, or fraud on the USPTO.29 A court finding such
inequitable conduct will render the patent unenforceable and therefore
worthless.30 An electronics company that owns thousands of patents, for
example, will need to draw attention to all of its patents that are remotely
relevant to the current application, without submitting so many that a court
might find they intended to camouflage the truly relevant references
within this deluge.
II.

THE ORIGINS OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

Part II presents the origin of the inequitable conduct doctrine as an
extension of common law equity principles regarding fraud, and its
subsequent evolution into a specialized remedy of patent invalidation for
fraud on the USPTO.
24. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2019).
25. Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 37, 93 (1993).
26. See generally Matthew Avery et al., The Return of the Plague: Inequitable Conduct After
Regeneron v. Merus, 34 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 328 (2018); Johnson, supra note 8.
27. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2019).
28. HRICIK & MEYER, supra note 5, at 129.
29. See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Once a court
concludes that inequitable conduct occurred, all the claims—not just the particular claims to which
the inequitable conduct is directly connected—are unenforceable.”).
30. See id.
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Fraud Comes to Patent Law

What is today called inequitable conduct began as a simple extension
of equity jurisdiction to revoke patents obtained by fraud.31 The United
States Supreme Court’s first reference to this doctrine appears in Railroad
Company v. Dubois,32 a 1870 infringement case involving a plan for
building a bridge.33 Knowing that he had infringed the patent, the
defendant in that case attempted to use allegations of fraud on the part of
the patentee as a defense.34 While the Supreme Court did not accept the
defendant’s reasoning, it did acknowledge that fraud on the patent could
constitute a defense against infringement claims,35 asserting that “[i]t is
impossible . . . to discover how the plaintiff’s silence on the occasion
mentioned tended at all to show a fraud upon the Patent Office, much less
that it constituted a fraud in law, so as to justify the court in ruling that he
could not maintain his action.”36 This decision was followed by the lower
courts, one of which noted that because the statutes did not authorize
independent challenges to validity on these grounds, “a patent procured
by fraud and collusion or by illegal procedure [could] be attacked only by
the government.”37 In other words, a court could refuse to enforce a patent
it knew to be procured by fraud, but a court could not invalidate the
patent itself.38
This judicial neutering of patents obtained by fraud was affirmed by
the Supreme Court in Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.,39
which held that the principles of equity did apply to fraud in patent law.40
A patentee had contracted with a prior user of his technology to keep that
prior use secret and suppress the evidence, enabling him to obtain a

31. 1 WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 382–83 (6th ed. 1929).
32. 79 U.S. 47 (1871).
33. Id. at 50.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 63–64.
36. Id.
37. W. Glass Co. v. Schmertz Wire-Glass Co., 185 F. 788, 791 (7th Cir. 1911). The Western Glass
Court followed the Supreme Court’s position at the time that the United States government had the sole
power to invalidate or vacate patents. See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 366 (1888).
38. See Goldman, supra note 25, at 43. The current Patent Code allows for the presumption of
validity to be rebutted by a showing that the patent failed to comply with the statutory requirements
for patentability. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2018). This can be asserted as a defense in an infringement suit, as
well as in administrative post-grant proceedings in the USPTO. Paul J. Korniczky & Elias P. Soupos,
Considerations for Using Post-Grant Proceedings to Attack Patent Validity, 7 LANDSLIDE 34 (2014).
39. 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
40. Id. at 247.
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favorable judgment in an earlier infringement case.41 Even though this
misbehavior had occurred in a previous case, the Court agreed with the
dismissal of the infringement claims, emphasizing that “[t]he equitable
powers of this court can never be exerted in [sic] behalf of one who has
acted fraudulently or who by deceit or any unfair means has gained an
advantage.”42 Fraud became a permanent consideration of patent law, and
succeeding years would see it evolve into an independent doctrine within
patent law.
B.

Inequitable Conduct Evolves as a Doctrine

While Keystone merely affirmed the dismissal of an infringement suit,
the case stood for the proposition that fraudulent patentees could not
enforce their patent rights.43 The Court extended this holding to cases of
fraud committed upon the USPTO in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. HartfordEmpire Co.44 Hazel-Atlas involved applicants who committed an
extremely brazen form of fraud: they had found a suitably pliant expert
who agreed to sign an article—written by the applicants—stating that their
putative invention was “revolutionary.”45 This ensured its publication in a
reputable trade journal, which was then submitted to the office as material
in support of patentability.46 While the patent did issue, an ensuing
infringement suit went against the patentees, as the defendants became
suspicious and initiated an investigation that uncovered the fraud.47 The
Supreme Court relied on Keystone in refusing to enforce the patent, but
went further, suggesting that the patent be vacated (although precedent
prevented the Court from doing so itself).48 Even if not vacated, however,
the Court had established that a patent obtained by fraud
was unenforceable.49
The Supreme Court fully characterized inequitable conduct a year later
in Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance

41. Id.
42. Id. at 245.
43. Id.
44. 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
45. Id. at 240.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 242.
48. Id. at 250. The Court had taken the position that because the United States had the sole power
to grant patents, it had the sole power to take them away from their lawful holders. United States v.
Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 366 (1888).
49. Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 245.
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Machinery Co.,50 noting that applicants had “an uncompromising duty to
report . . . all facts concerning possible fraud or inequitableness
underlying the applications in issue.”51 The Court’s language concerning
this new duty in Kingsland v. Dorsey52 laid down the rules by which
applicants would now find themselves playing: applicants would
henceforth be held to “the highest degree of candor and good faith” in
their dealings with the office, a moral standard that would guide future
developments in the law.53
III. THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT AND ITS EFFECT ON
PATENT PROSECUTION
Part III concerns the gradual establishment of codified requirements for
the disclosure of prior art, and how those duties became wrapped within
the duty of candor enforced by the courts through the inequitable conduct
doctrine. This Part will also address the current relation between
inequitable conduct and the duty to disclose prior art within the
United States.
A.

The Lack of an Initial Disclosure Requirement

Just as the inequitable conduct doctrine was not fully formed by the
courts until the postwar era,54 the codified duty to disclose prior art was
also late to evolve. For most of its existence, the USPTO did not require
that the applicant disclose any prior art.55 In 1974, the handbook used to
examine patents advised examiners that the applicants would usually
submit a “background of the invention,” ordinarily comprising a statement
of the field of art and a description of the prior art, which included
references to specific prior art “where applicable.”56 However, all that was
required to be disclosed was “a complete revelation or disclosure of the
invention.”57 Given the incentives discussed in Part I, such would seem
reasonable: applicants had every reason to disclose prior art to best ensure
50. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
51. Id. at 818.
52. 338 U.S. 318 (1949).
53. Id. at 319.
54. Id.
55. Gina M. Bicknell, To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Duty of Candor Obligations of the United
States and Foreign Patent Offices, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 425, 428–29 (2008).
56. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINATION PROCEDURE § 608.01(C) (3d ed. 1974) (Background of the Invention [R–41]).
57. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINATION PROCEDURE § 608 (3d ed. 1974) (Disclosure [R–35]).
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the strengths of their patents, and the courts could handle what few cases
of genuine fraud occurred.58
However, the very broad guidance given by the Supreme Court towards
inequitable conduct posed new challenges.59 The various independent
determinations of the lower courts as to what precisely constituted
“candor and good faith” left patent practitioners unsure of what their
responsibilities were in the disclosure of prior art.60 One federal district
court stated that an applicant who knew of a printed publication plainly
describing or anticipating the claimed invention but did not disclose it
would not be excused from assertions of inequitable conduct.61 However,
that court then noted that the applicant had no duty to cite every
publication they knew of, even if such a publication was likely to be
referred to by a vigilant examiner or an opposing party in a third-party
proceeding.62 Other courts applied different standards, from requiring
“fault, willfulness, or bad faith,”63 to exempting practitioners who
demonstrated good faith.64
Contemporary authorities saw these inconsistent standards as posing a
challenge to patent practitioners of the time.65 As one practitioner noted,
“[t]he best solution would appear to be to disclose and make of record all
pertinent prior art. Yet [this practice] might, it itself, be hazardous,”
because accidental omission of earlier work could also constitute
misrepresentation, leading the contemporaneous attorney vulnerable to
fraud claims from that angle.66 This confusion led to calls for
standardization in the coming years.
B.

The Institution of a Disclosure Requirement: Why?

Confusion persisted over what prior art applicants were obligated to
provide.67 In 1963, the Commissioner for Patents (at the time the agency
58. See Kesan & Banik, supra note 14, at 36–37.
59. John W. Malley, Patent Litigation and Inferences, in PATENT PROCUREMENT AND
EXPLOITATION 91–94 (LaDoris Morgan Whitney ed., 1963).
60. Id. at 91–92.
61. United States v. Standard Elec. Time Co., 155 F. Supp. 949, 952 (D. Mass. 1957).
62. Id.
63. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 538 F.2d 180, 195
(8th Cir. 1976).
64. See Oetiker v. Jurid Werke GMBH, 671 F.2d 596, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“A good faith
judgment not to cite prior art to the PTO, even if erroneous, cannot be fraud.”).
65. See Malley, supra note 59, at 92–93.
66. Id.
67. D. Carl Richards, Recent Developments, in PATENT LAW DEVELOPMENTS 59 (LaDoris Morgan
Whitney ed., 1964).
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head of the USPTO) proposed a new rule that would have required
applicants to cite any known published art that the applicant believed to
be “significantly pertinent” to the application.68 However, objections
caused the Office to back down, and instead merely “advise” that
applicants inform it of any art that would be “helpful to the Office” during
examination.69 The asserted reasoning for this request was to aid the
USPTO in dealing with the volume of prior art that must be searched,70
indicating that practical considerations, as well as legal, motivated the
Office’s decision.
The USPTO’s 1963 attempts at instituting a mandatory duty to disclose
prior art may have failed, but the goal received a significant shot in the
arm from the 1967 Report of the President’s Commission on the Patent
System.71 The Report had several broad goals, namely: (1) raising the
quality and reliability of U.S. Patents; (2) shortening the period of
pendency for applications; (3) accelerating the public disclosure of
technological innovations; (4) reducing the expense of obtaining and
litigating a patent; (5) making U.S. patent practice more compatible with
the rest of the world; and (6) preparing the patent system for an explosion
of new technology.72 The Report was, in many ways, remarkably
prescient: it recommended the implementation of a first-to-file system,
provisional applications, and published applications.73 The Report did not,
however, recommend amending the patent regulations to require further
disclosure of relevant art by the applicant.74
Following on Congress’s inability to pass a patent act incorporating
these recommendations, the USPTO’s parent agency, the Department of
Commerce, used its institutional authority change the patent laws itself.75
68. Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 28 Fed. Reg. 7513 (July 24, 1963) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
69. See Richards, supra note 67.
70. Id. at 59; see also Samuel M. Mims, Jr. et al., Panel Discussion: Recent Developments in Patent
Law, in 1966 PATENT LAW ANNUAL 266 (Virginia S. Cameron ed., 1966) (expressing hope that
voluntary reporting of prior art would preserve the presumption of validity, another possible rationale
for making mandatory such disclosure).
71. S. REP. NO. 71-184 (1967). The Commission included both public and government
representatives. Id. at 4.
72. Id. at 11–12.
73. Id. at 13, 16, 24. These features, now mainstays of the American patent system, would not be
enshrined in law for many years. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
Stat. 284, 285 (2011) (moving the United States to a first-to-file system); District of Columbia
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1536 (1999) (incorporating by reference S.
1948, 106th Cong. (1999), requiring patent applications to be published after eighteen months);
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4986–87 (1994) (allowing for
the filing of provisional patent applications).
74. See generally S. Rep. No. 71-184 (1967).
75. Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 41 Fed. Reg. 43729, 43733 (Oct. 4, 1976) (to be
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This included a key change not recommended by the President’s
Commission: the institution of a codified duty to disclose prior art.76
Under the guise of “codif[ying] the existing Office policy on fraud and
inequitable conduct,” the Department amended 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 to
require the inventor, each attorney or agent, and every other individual
“substantively involved” in the preparation or prosecution of the
application “to disclose to the Office information they are aware of which
is material to the examination of the application.”77 Whether or not
information was material was essentially left in the hands of the examiners
and the courts. The new rule defined materiality as “where there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it
important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as
a patent.”78
This rule has been revisited—it was rewritten in 1992 in order to better
formalize the system for disclosure by providing a streamlined process for
submitting the required references79—but the overall duty has not
changed.80 The applicant is required to disclose information material to
patentability of pending claims, and specifically encouraged to examine
foreign search reports.81 Information “material to patentability” is defined
as information “not cumulative to information already of record or being
made of record in the application” and creating “by itself or in
combination with other information, a prima facie case of unpatentability
of a claim,” or contrary to an applicant’s argument of patentability.82 But
these changes are relatively minor in their effect on practitioners when
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
76. Id.
77. Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5587, 5589, 5593 (Jan. 28, 1977) (to
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
78. Id. at 5593.
79. Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 10).
It has been suggested that a significant motivation for this change was the “plague” of inequitable
conduct defenses in the patent courts of the time. See Mammen, supra note 8, at 1336.
80. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2019) (“Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution
of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes
a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to
patentability”), with 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977) (“All such individuals have a duty to disclose to the
Office information they are aware of which is material to the examination of the application.”).
81. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2019).
82. Id. This regulation has been rewritten twice more since 1992, but only to keep its provisions
coherent with other changes in the patent regulations. See Changes To Implement the Inventor’s Oath
or Declaration Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 48776, 48788 (Aug.
14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1); Changes To Implement the Patent Business Goals, 65
Fed. Reg. 54604, 54623 (Sept. 8, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1); Duty of Disclosure, 57
Fed. Reg. 2007, 2021 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 10).
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compared to the decisions of the courts, particularly the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.
C.

The Rise of The Federal Circuit as a Response to Confusion in the
Circuit Courts

Over the years, the courts had developed a test for inequitable conduct
claims centered on the materiality of the omitted references, and the intent
(or absence thereof) of the solicitor in omitting them.83 However, absent
guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower courts had reached different
conclusions regarding the thresholds for these findings.84
With regards to materiality, the simplest and most difficult for
infringers to show was but-for materiality: where the patent “would not
have issued” had the misrepresentation not occurred.85 However, given
the difficulty of proving what an examiner would have done had they
known of the reference, other circuits adopted a more objective material
or relevant test, where materiality would be found if the misrepresentation
“would affect the [e]xaminer’s evaluation” of patentability.86 Still others,
harkening back to the origins of unclean hands in equity law, held that any
misconduct, even if completely nonmaterial to whether the patent issued,
warranted invalidation of the patent.87
By contrast, intent was a simpler matter, with only two conflicting
interpretations: some courts endorsed a deliberate intent requirement,
again holding true to doctrine’s origins in equitable fraud, while others
allowed even gross negligence to serve as requisite intent.88 Nonetheless,
the different standards for intent, like those for materiality, caused
confusion on a national level.

83. William L. La Fuze, Prior Art in Patent Solicitation, in 1977 PATENT LAW ANNUAL 46
(Virginia Shook Cameron, ed., 1977).
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Pfizer Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968)).
86. CTS Corp. v. Piher Int’l Corp., 527 F.2d 95, 100 (7th Cir. 1975); see also SCM Corp. v. Radio
Corp. of Am., 318 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (rejecting application of the “but for” test due to
impracticability).
87. Honeywell Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., No. 4-67 C.I.V. 138, 1973 WL 903, at *7 (D. Minn. Oct.
19, 1973) (“Whether the applicant’s misconduct was material in the procurement of the patent is of
no consequence. If the conduct of the applicant is reprehensible, it matters not that it was really
unnecessary, and the patent is unenforceable.”).
88. Compare Scott Paper Co. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 432 F.2d 1198, 1204 (7th Cir. 1970)
(requiring deliberate misrepresentation), with Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
(“Where public policy demands a complete and accurate disclosure it may suffice to show nothing
more than that the misrepresentations were made in an atmosphere of gross negligence as to their
truth.”).
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This confusion coincided with a widespread lack of uniformity in how
the courts treated patent law.89 The lack of uniformity was addressed in
the creation of the Federal Circuit, a single court of appeals for all patent
cases (as well as other subjects that required national uniformity of
jurisdiction).90 In its first cases involving inequitable conduct and the duty
of candor, the Circuit seemed content with the more lax standards applied
by one of its predecessor courts, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
which used gross negligence as an intent threshold. This measured
inequitable conduct on a sliding scale of intent versus materiality, where
a stronger showing of one requirement could compensate for weaker
evidence of the other.91 Under this weak standard, assertions of
inequitable conduct soon swamped the federal courts, and the Federal
Circuit attempted to discourage claims of inequitable conduct to stem
the tide.92
For decades, the Federal Circuit attempted to “cure the plague” of
spurious inequitable conduct allegations,93 which were cropping up in
almost every major case because of the unclear standards as to what
constituted inequitable conduct.94 The Federal Circuit raised the threshold
to require both materiality (of the inequitable conduct, for example, of an
omitted reference) and intent to deceive to be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.95 When that failed to sufficiently cut off pleading of
inequitable conduct, the court threw up procedural hurdles, holding that
“‘[i]nequitable conduct, while a broader concept than fraud, must be pled
with particularity’ under Rule 9(b).”96 Pleading with particularity required
the party alleging a failure to cite prior art to allege what prior art had been
intentionally omitted.97 Most recently, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
89. See MARION T. BENNETT, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A
HISTORY, 1982–1990, at 7–11 (1991).
90. See id; Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 37–
39 (1982).
91. See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
abrogated by Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Driscoll
v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984), abrogated by Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson
& Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
92. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See generally
KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor, Inc., 778 F.2d 1571, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
93. Robert D. Swanson, The Exergen and Therasense Effects, 66 STAN. L. REV. 695, 703; see also
Mammen, supra note 8, at 1338–39 (concerning the USPTO’s efforts to combat the “plague”).
94. See Mammen, supra note 8, at 1338.
95. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
96. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326 (2009) (quoting Ferguson
Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Resources, Inc. v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1344
(Fed. Cir. 2003)).
97. Id.
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Dickinson & Co.98 further heightened the burdens for proving that
inequitable conduct had occurred, holding that “the materiality required
to establish inequitable conduct is but-for materiality”.99 The court
defined “but-for material” undisclosed prior art as that which “the PTO
would not have allowed a claim had it been aware.”100 In doing so, the
Federal Circuit explicitly criticized the USPTO’s materiality standard,
noting that “reliance on this standard has resulted in the very problems
this court sought to address” with regards to the flood of
questionable references.101
D.

The Current State of Prior Art Disclosure

The combination of the particularity requirement, and the heightened
standards of Therasense, seem to have finally cut off the plague of
inequitable conduct.102 As commentator Robert D. Swanson has noted,
“[t]he prevalence of inequitable conduct claims has decreased from 17%
to 8% of patent cases.”103 However, the debate has not ended.104 Indeed,
some argue that the Circuit has gone too far, as the doctrinal duty of
candor can now be reasonably characterized as excluding some actions
that would fall afoul of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.105 It is arguable that some actions
the USPTO would legitimately consider misconduct will nonetheless go
unpunished, because the Federal Circuit, and thus the Federal Courts, do
not have the same definitions for misconduct.106
Unfortunately, the second-order effects of the inequitable conduct
plague persist. Because the failure to disclose prior art remains a very
plausible ground for inequitable conduct claims, practitioners are still
required to make difficult decisions about what art is known by all parties

98. 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
99. Id. at 1291.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1294.
102. Swanson, supra note 93, at 724.
103. Id.
104. See generally John M. Golden, Patent Law’s Falstaff: Inequitable Conduct, the Federal
Circuit, and Therasense, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 353 (2012) (casting doubt on whether the
Therasense effects will solve keep inequitable conduct from being a further thorn in the side of the
Federal Circuit); Johnson, supra note 8 (arguing that the inequitable conduct defense should be
eliminated).
105. Swanson, supra note 93, at 724.
106. See id.; Gideon Mark & T. Leigh Anenson, Inequitable Conduct and Walker Process Claims
after Therasense and the America Invents Act, 16 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 361, 380–81 (2014) (noting that
the PTO had not yet updated Rule 56 in response to the Therasense decision).
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within the ambit of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.107 The USPTO’s Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure offers some guidelines but errs, like many
practitioners, on the side of submitting all known references if they could
be even remotely characterized as prior art.108 In contrast, it has in the past
been suggested by the USPTO that citing too many references without
identifying those of particular importance could itself constitute
inequitable conduct, if the intent was to “bur[y]” a material reference
amidst hundreds of irrelevant documents.109
This has resulted in confusion among patent attorneys. Practitioners
concerned with possible inequitable conduct charges are incentivized to
file any reference that could be construed as relevant in any sense—a
“blizzard” of prior art filings.110 Moreover, the provided references do not
seem to be helping the USPTO to determine either novelty or
nonobviousness. Where applicant submissions accounted for 76% of
references cited in a sample of patent applications, only 2% of applicantcited references were cited in rejections by the USPTO—compared to
nearly 40% of examiner-cited references.111 Michael Frakes and Melissa
Wasserman have suggested that examiners choose to focus their prior art
comparisons on what they find themselves, trusting those references to
provide them with the most insight in the limited time they have to
examine the patent. This, however, undermines the purpose of prior art
disclosure and threatens the presumption of validity that such disclosure
was instituted to protect.112
IV. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The United States is not unique in its duty of disclosure, but it is the
only one of the world’s five busiest offices113 to impose this duty.114 Most
foreign patent offices either require no duty of disclosure, or only require
107. See id.
108. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINATION PROCEDURE 2004(10) (rev. 08.2017, 2018).
109. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2002.03 (rev. 3, 1986).
110. See Robert Brendan Taylor, Burying, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 99, 127-8.
111. Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter?, 42 RES. POL’Y 844,
846–47 (2013).
112. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence From Micro-Level Application
Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20337, 2014).
113. The others being China, Japan, Korea, and Europe. Patents, WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY INDICATORS 2017, 30 (2017).
114. See infra sections IV.A–C.
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disclosure upon the request of the examiner.115 In general, they approach
prior art disclosure in one of three ways. Some countries, like the United
States, impose a duty on applicants to provide their office with all known
prior art. Other countries require more limited forms of disclosure, such
as merely identifying material references (rather than requiring their
submission), or only requiring the submission of the search reports carried
out (and reported to the applicant) by other countries’ offices. Last, some
national patent offices have done away entirely with the duty to disclose
prior art, placing this duty on the office and the examiner. In this part, I
will examine the practices of several foreign patent offices, all in countries
with advanced research sectors like that of the United States.116
A.

Full Disclosure

Israel has similar disclosure rules to the United States.117 The examiner
can require the applicant to submit any art obtained in foreign prosecution
as well as publications “which are known to the applicant and directly
relate to the invention.”118 Furthermore, applicants also need to provide
the counterpart foreign applications, and even “publications and
references referred to in publications and references which the applicant
is required to provide under this Article, where the examiner so
demands.”119 Penalties are correspondingly harsh—not only can the
Israeli Office cancel the patent, but they can also simply assign it to
another party, and impose sanctions on any practitioner who knowingly
did not keep the Office informed of a substantive change in the list of
references and publications.120
China, meanwhile, requires the submission of “reference materials
relating to the invention,” and their patent office can require the

115. Jay Erstling, Patent Law and the Duty of Candor: Rethinking the Limits of Disclosure, 44
CREIGHTON L. REV. 329, 356 (2011).
116. The six countries chosen rank within the top twenty-five of WIPO’s 2019 Global Innovation
Index. “Europe” as a whole is not ranked, but European countries constitute fifteen of the top twentyfive. CORNELL UNIV. ET AL., THE GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2019: CREATING HEALTHY LIVES—
THE FUTURE OF MEDICAL INNOVATION xxxiv (Soumitra Dutta et al. eds., 12th ed. 2019) [hereinafter
GII 2019]. The GII defines an innovation as “a new or improved product or process (or combination
thereof) that differs significantly from the unit’s previous products or processes and that has been
made available to potential users (product) or brought into use by the unit (process).” Id. at 205.
Crucially, this takes into account both patent and nonpatent innovations, which the patent system is
also designed to encourage.
117. C.f. Bicknell, supra note 55, at 461.
118. Patents Law, 5727-1967, § 18 (2014) (Isr.).
119. Id.
120. Id. § 18C.
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submission of any patent searches carried out by a foreign office.121 The
Chinese Patent Office defines the required reference materials as those
“which can be regarded as useful for the understanding, searching and
examination of the invention or utility model.”122 The penalty for failing
to do so is invalidation of the patent.123
B.

Partial Disclosure

Other foreign offices require a limited form of prior art disclosure, with
requirements more specific than those of the United States.124 Japan, for
example, requires identification (though not submission) of any known art
“related to the [] invention, that has been known to the public through
publication at the time of filing of the patent application.”125 A more
limited form of disclosure can be found in the European Patent Office,
which formerly maintained no such requirement, relying solely on its own
examiners to find and compare art with the application at hand.126 Today,
the code has been amended to require a limited disclosure: “the results of
any search carried out by the authority with which [a] previous application
was filed” with a foreign office.127 The EU’s rule is still far clearer than
any comparable rule, as it requires no exercise of discretion on the part of
the practitioner, and is quite simple to fulfill—all that need be reported is
the results of searches by other offices.128 A similar requirement can be
found in the Canadian Patent Rules, where examiners may request from
applicants any prior art cited in a counterpart foreign application, but does
not require any submission beyond that.129

121. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanlifa (
) [Patent Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. on Dec. 27,
2008),
art. 36
(2008),
Chinese
National
Intellectual
Property
Administration,
http://english.cnipa.gov.cn/lawpolicy/patentlawsregulations/915574.htm (last visited May 23, 2020).
122. Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, Rule 18(2).
123. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 45 (2008).
124. See generally Bicknell, supra note 55.
125. Tokkyo-hō
[Patent
Act],
Act
No.
121
of
1959,
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=3118&vm=04&re=02.

art.

36(4)(ii),

126. Jeffrey M. Kuhn, Information Overload at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Reframing
the Duty of Disclosure in Patent Law as a Search and Filter Problem, 13 YALE J. L. & TECH. 89, 135
(2010).
127. European Patent Convention, Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of
European Patents, Rule 141 (2016).
128. Id.
129. Patent Rules, SOR/96-423, § 29.
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No Disclosure

Other countries do not even bother to require the applicant to report the
result of counterpart searches, even upon instruction by the office. In
South Korea, even the requirement that applicants submit the results of
counterpart searches does not exist.130 If necessary, the Patent
Commissioner can assign an institution to conduct a prior art search
themselves, but the law also leaves open the possibility of the examiner
calling on other experts within the government for technical issues.131
Finally, Australia provides an example of a country which has revised its
patent laws frequently and moved wholly away from mandating applicant
disclosure of prior art.132 Australia first imposed a duty to disclose prior
art in 2001, but lessened this requirement over the years, until now there
is no duty whatsoever.133
Foreign patent offices feature a wide spectrum of disclosure
requirements, from the strict standards of China and Israel to the more
relaxed approach of South Korea and Australia. Yet more onerous
disclosure requirements do not seem to have resulted in a higherperforming innovation sector in those countries. For instance, Israel and
South Korea’s Global Innovation scores, as ranked by the World
Intellectual Property Organization, are nearly identical.134
V.

WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD AMEND THE DUTY
OF DISCLOSURE

There is a lesson to be learned from these comparisons: other countries
have not imposed a duty upon the applicant to submit prior art, or have
moved away from such a duty, and yet still maintain thriving innovation
sectors. Meanwhile, the United States maintains its duty to disclose at
great cost to both patentholders and the public. Following the method used
by the European Patent Office would solve two big problems in patent
law: the uncertain standards for inequitable conduct promulgated by the
Federal Circuit, and the inefficiency in patent examination caused by the
filing of needless references.
Looking at the numerous Federal Circuit cases addressing inequitable
conduct, it is no surprise that considerable ink has been spilled on the
130. KR Patent Act, art. 58(a-b).
131. Id.
132. See Bicknell, supra note 55, at 458 n.180.
133. See Patents Act 1990, compilation No. 42 (2018), for the current law governing patents in
Australia; see also Bicknell, supra note 55, at 458 n.180.
134. See GII 2019, supra note 116, at xxxiv.
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matter in various law journals, nor that the Federal Circuit sought to solve
the problem by making the intent and materiality standards prohibitively
high in Therasense.135 Yet perhaps it is not the inequitable conduct
doctrine that was, or is, the problem. Punishing fraud in patent prosecution
would seem to be an unalloyed good, as such fraud undermines the
presumption of validity at the heart of our patent system.136 Whether the
failure to disclose references to the patent office should even constitute
fraud is another question, as courts have become decreasingly likely to
allow for claims of fraud for the failure to disclose information (rather
than for misrepresentations).137 That inequitable conduct became so
central to patent litigation may indicate that the duties the office imposes
on practitioners are impossible to conform to with any degree
of certainty.138
The United States is not unique in its duty of disclosure, but it is
unusual. The vast majority of the world’s patent offices either require no
duty of disclosure or have a much more limited form of the duty in
comparison to the United States, such as the requirement of search reports
from other patent offices in counterpart foreign applications.139 These
offices primarily rely on their examiners to find prior art, yet in the United
States, the duty of disclosure places responsibility on the applicant.140 This
rule was an attempt to codify existing Office policies and court doctrines,
and in doing so to provide consistency and guidance to applicants and
patentees.141 Yet its effect has been to create an epidemic of fraud
allegations in the patent courts,142 and to impose on practitioners a
confusing, costly, and ineffective duty to provide the office with any
information material to the patentability of an application.143 American
patent attorneys must inform the USPTO of all material art throughout the
examination process, or risk claims of inequitable conduct.144
Furthermore, a diligent attorney in the United States must also take care
135. See Swanson, supra note 93, at 696.
136. Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 1569
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
137. Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of
Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1799–800 (2005).
138. See HRICIK & MEYER, supra note 5.
139. See Erstling supra note 115, at 356.
140. See Bicknell supra note 55, at 436.
141. Patent Examining and Appeal Procedure, 42 Fed. Reg. 5587, 5589 (Jan. 28, 1977) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
142. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]he habit of
charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague.”).
143. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 14 (2017).
144. See HRICIK & MEYER, supra note 5, at 111.
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that their clients follow suit and disclose all information they know of,
else they may be vulnerable to the same claims and risk invalidation of
their patents.145
This has caused a separate plague upon patent law: the “burying” of the
USPTO in references impose tremendous costs on the patent system.146
Attorneys have every incentive to file a copy of every reference they are
aware of with the USPTO. There is no penalty for doing so, and they risk
danger—however difficult the courts make it to prove—in omitting a
reference and opening themselves up to inequitable conduct allegations.147
Similarly, there is no incentive to indicate which references are material
to which claims, as it runs the risk of implying that other references could
not be as material.148 Lastly, the benefits of providing the examiner with
any references at all seems insignificant. This is borne out by the
examiners themselves, who have claimed to prefer the applicant provide
no references at all rather than burden them with “boxloads” of art that
they are then obliged to read through.149
As these floods of references have become increasingly ordinary, an
unscrupulous attorney could choose to file hundreds of irrelevant
references alongside a truly material, possibly invalidating reference, and
hope the examiner would be unable to pick out the materiality.150 While
this would seem to fit the definition of inequitable conduct, the heightened
standards imposed by Therasense make it unlikely an infringer could
effectively prove these claims as a defense. The Federal Circuit’s
definition of “materiality” is far stricter than that used by the USPTO.151
Proving by “clear and convincing” evidence that an attorney meant to
deceive the patent office in this manner would be practically impossible
absent a smoking gun.152 The examiner therefore could be induced to miss
145. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 729 (2009).
146. See Taylor supra note 110, at 114–20.
147. See HRICIK & MEYER, supra note 5, at 129–30.
148. Id. at 133.
149. David Popp et al., Time in Purgatory: Determinants of the Grant Lag for U.S. Patent
Applications (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9518, Feb. 2003).
150. Id.
151. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2019), with Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d
1276, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (adopting but-for materiality as a standard). The USPTO has twice
proposed adjustment of its definition of materiality to the Therasense standard. Revision of the Duty
To Disclose Information in Patent Applications and Reexamination Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 74,987
(proposed Oct. 28, 2016) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1); Revision of the Materiality to Patentability
Standard for the Duty To Disclose Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43, 631 (proposed
July 21, 2011) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). These changes have yet to be adopted.
152. For example, a letter from the client instructing the attorney to bury a newly-discovered
reference. Intent to deceive can be inferred from circumstance, but not if “there are multiple
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a reference that, while not dispositive, would affect the scope of granted
claims. Yet an inequitable conduct defense would likely be unable to
prove this, as the but-for materiality standard would require the defendant
to show that if a reasonable examiner had seen the reference, they would
not have granted that claim.153 Inequitable conduct has its purpose in
patent infringement suits: it is to punish those who have committed fraud
in fact on the USPTO, not to serve as a plausible defense to every claim
of infringement.154
Some have proposed that these problems would best be remedied by
eliminating the inequitable conduct defense altogether.155 However, a
better idea would be to instead eliminate the duty of candor as it currently
exists, and to adopt the European standard—for instance, no duty to
disclose whatsoever, save for search reports issued by other countries.
This would serve examiners better, because all references provided by
applicants would be deemed relevant by another patent office, making it
far more likely that another examiner would see them similarly. More
importantly, it clearly indicates to the patent prosecutor which references
need to be provided and relieves them of the need to do any inquiries
themselves. Under this proposal, even the most diligent attorney would
only need to forward foreign search reports to fully discharge their duty
under the law.
This would be a drastic step, but neither as drastic nor as foreign as it
might seem at first. The Federal Circuit itself indicated that the USPTO’s
standards for disclosure were too broad when they declined to adopt their
materiality standards in Therasense.156 The USPTO claimed to have
looked to the 1967 Report of the President’s Commission on the Patent
System when creating the initial duty of disclosure, yet a reading of that
document recommends no such creation. The innovations proposed by the
commission included provisional applications, published applications,
and a first-to-file system. These were aimed at raising the quality and
reliability of patents, shortening the period of pendency, accelerating the
disclosure of technological advances, reducing the expense of obtaining
and litigating a patent. These changes made U.S. patent practice more

reasonable inferences that may be drawn.” Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.
153. See Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus B.V., 144 F. Supp. 3d 530, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d
sub nom. Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding that
withheld references which disclose “the same benefits and results” would have prevented a reasonable
examiner from finding certain claims patentable).
154. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1294–95 (noting that the Federal Circuit’s decision was motivated
in part with the goal of preventing inequitable conduct from becoming a rote defense to infringement).
155. See generally Johnson, supra note 8.
156. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1294–95.
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compatible with that of other major countries and preparing the patent
system to cope with new technologies.157 Easing prior art disclosure
requirements would have a very similar effect.
Removing the specter of inequitable conduct allegations from ordinary
(non-fraudulent) patent practice will raise the reliability of patents
because a diligent attorney will no longer be confused as to what
constitutes their duty of disclosure. Furthermore, placing the
responsibility of the patent search solely on the examiner will shorten the
period of pendency, as the examiner will no longer need to consider
applicant-submitted references of dubious relevancy. This itself will
accelerate the disclosure of technological advances. In combination with
the elimination or reduction in the filing of references, this will reduce the
expense of obtaining a patent. Finally, conforming to the disclosure rules
applicable in most of the world will make U.S. practice more compatible
with those countries and will recognize modern technologies that have
placed the world’s information at the fingertips of the examiner.
CONCLUSION
The current patent system in the United States is not fatally flawed. Yet
while the current duty of disclosure may not be a malignant tumor, and
Therasense may have alleviated the epidemic of inequitable conduct, our
system is still far weaker than it could be. No party benefits from the
current duty of disclosure. It has resulted in wasted money, confused
practitioners, and a less predictable system than the alternative systems
practiced by the United States’s economic partners across the globe.
Removing the duty to disclose from our patent regulations would not just
lift the remaining sickness from our patent laws: it would also place us in
better harmony with the international community and recognize the
technological advancements that have placed the world’s prior art at the
fingertips of the patent examiner. These effects, salutary on their own, are
also fully in accord with the motivations of the 1967 President’s
Commission, which has been the guide for so many of our advances in the
patent laws. For as the Commission recognized, the mission of the United
States patent system is not simply to grant quality patents, or to reject
those that are unworthy: it is to promote the progress of useful arts,
translate that progress into better living standards, and in doing so, make
the world a better place.158 The rules as they exist do not serve that
function—indeed, they hinder it—and so they should be changed.

157. S. REP. NO. 71-184, at 12 (1967).
158. Id. at 2.

